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Tax Policy for Financing Alternative Energy Equipment 
 






  European countries have taken the lead in investing in renewable energy 
electricity generating capital.  While the EU-15 countries had less than half the installed 
capacity of the United States in 1990, they currently have more than double the capacity.  
This study investigates differences in the policy environment between Europe and the 
United States and identifies key policy differences that impact renewable electricity 
investment. 
  The review of the European and US experience provides a number of lessons to 
guide future renewables policy in the United States.  First, the European experiment with 
feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards suggests that feed-in tariffs may 
dominate RPS systems as effective policy tools to encourage investment.  Second, the US 
preference for tax incentives has clearly not had the same simulative investment impact 
as have feed-in tariffs.  Third, a modest feed-in tariff for wind and biomass would make 
these technologies cost competitive with natural gas.  Fourth, it is clear that considerable 
research and technological development will be required before solar electricity can 
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  Rising energy costs along with energy security and climate concerns have 
increased national interest in and attention to renewable electricity generation.  While the 
United States has made great strides in renewable electricity investment, it has been far 
outstripped by many European countries.  The purpose of this analysis is to glean lessons 
from the European experience and make recommendations for future policy in the United 
States.   
II.    International Comparisons   
 
  The major focus of this study is to identify policies to encourage investment in 
renewable electricity capital that may be more effective than current U.S. policies.  I 
begin with a comparative analysis of a number of key developed countries.    The United 
States lags sharply in its growth rate for renewable capacity (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1.  Annualized Capacity Growth Rates 
Year US  EU-
15  Denmark Germany Neth Spain  UK 
1990-1995  2.3% 10.1% 17.4%  20.7%  17.2% 15.3% 31.5%
1995-2000  0.8% 20.0% 25.3%  27.0%  12.1% 53.0% 18.4%
2000-2004  5.2% 16.4% 7.5%  18.9%  16.6% 30.1% 10.7%
1990-2004  2.9% 16.6% 17.8%  23.9%  16.5% 34.5% 21.5%
Source: IEA and author's calculations 
 
The United States had an annualized growth rate between 1990 and 2004 of just under 3 
percent while the EU-15 as a group exhibited a growth rate of over 16 percent.  The US 
growth rate has increased in the first half of this decade, but it is still far below that of the 
EU-15 or any of the high growth countries within the EU.  Germany and Spain are    G.  Metcalf 
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particularly noteworthy with annual growth rates of 19 and 30 percent respectively since 
2000. 
  The next three figures provide information about the share of renewable energy in 
generation for three key renewable sources. 
 































  Figure 1 shows the share of wind in renewables for the leading EU countries.  
Denmark, Spain, and Germany are the European leaders.  The United States lags far 
behind many of these countries.  The United States does a bit better relative to other EU 
countries in solar power (Figure 2) though solar has not made much of an inroad in any 
of these countries.
2   
                                                 
2   Looking beyond the EU, Japan is the world leader in solar capacity with 1,132 MW installed as of 2004.  
This is in contrast to 753 MW installed in the United States.    G.  Metcalf 
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Figure 2.  Solar Share in 2004 Generation
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  The United States also lags behind many EU countries in biomass generation as a 
share of its total generation (Figure 3).  Finland is the world leader in biomass followed 
by Denmark and Italy. 
  These data suggest important policy differences between the United States and 
Europe.   
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III.    Policy Review 
 
  In this section I describe various policies used to support renewable electricity 
generation investment in the United States and other developed countries.  The United 
States has historically supported renewable capacity investment through the federal tax 
code and through state level renewable portfolio standard (RPS) programs.  Europe, in 
contrast, has relied heavily on feed-in tariffs.  These three instruments have in common 
that they increase the revenue received by sellers of renewable electricity, the first 
through tax credits and the latter two through payments from electricity purchasers (grid 
operator or distributor).
3  A key difference among the programs is the source of funds for 
the subsidy.  For tax credits, the subsidy is paid for by the taxpayer while for the feed-in 
tariff and RPS programs, it is paid for by rate-payers.  As I'll discuss below, this has 
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major implications for the political support shown for the various programs.  In addition 
to these three support mechanisms, I will briefly mention a fourth support structure that 
has been used but which is being supplanted by these other mechanisms. 
A. Feed-In  Tariffs   
 
Feed-in tariffs are policies that require electricity suppliers to purchase power 
from renewable electricity sources at given prices for a set number of years.  The price is 
either a fixed tariff or a fixed premium above market prices.  Feed-in tariffs subsidize 
renewable electricity production through the electricity rate base rather than the tax base 
and thus are generally more stable over the long-run than tax credits.  As discussed 
below, they also differ in that the value of the subsidy is not related to the profitability of 
the energy supplying company.   
  As of late 2006, eighteen of the twenty-five countries in the EU had some sort of 
feed-in tariff for renewable electricity.
4  Feed-in tariffs offer either a set price for 
electricity generated by the facility over a given number of years or a premium over the 
market price.  In general suppliers are required to purchase electricity offered under the 
fixed tariff scheme but are not so obligated under the premium system.  Rates are 
typically set so that the total payment under the premium system (the market price plus 
premium) exceeds the fixed tariff payment.  One of the attractions of the feed-in tariff is 
that the rate set under the fixed tariff is generally based on the retail rather than the 
delivery price for electricity.   
B. Renewable  Portfolio  Standards 
  Renewable portfolio standards are policy measures with two components. First, 
quotas for electricity produced from renewable sources are set, generally as a percentage 
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of electricity production.  The quotas must be met at a designated level, either by 
suppliers of electricity or by distributors.  Second, generators of renewable electricity 
typically obtain renewable electricity certificates (RECs) that are marketable.  Trading in 
RECs occurs with the group that is required to provide evidence that they have achieved 
their renewable quota doing so by submitting RECs to the monitoring agency.  The 
market price for RECs provides a subsidy to renewable electricity generators that 
combined with the market price received for selling electricity offsets their higher 
generating costs. 
  In Europe, RPS programs exist in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and Poland.  To date, it does not appear that the RPS systems in Europe have been 
particularly effective.  Belgium allows a penalty for non-compliance with the target of 
€92 per MWh in the Walloon region and €110 per MWh in Flanders.  Given the limits in 
place, it is more advantageous to pay the penalty than purchase certificates (European 
Commission (2007a).  Italy and Poland’s quotas appear to be poorly regulated.    
  The United States has enthusiastically embraced RPS programs at the state level.  
Currently, thirty programs run by states, local government, or utilities operate in twenty-
six states.
5  Of these, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia run mandatory RPS 
programs covering roughly 40 percent of the nation’s electrical load (Wiser et al. (2007)).  
Wiser et al. (2007) in their assessment of state level programs conclude that  
experience with these policies remain somewhat limited; few of the states 
have more than five years of experience with their programs, and some of 
the policies have been established but have not yet taken effect. 
Wiser, et al. (2007), p. 12. 
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C. Tax  Incentives 
 
  In Europe, only Finland and Malta rely entirely on tax incentives to encourage the 
production of renewable energy.
6  Finland subsidizes electricity produced from 
renewable sources at different rates according to the fuel and provides investment tax 
credits up to 30 percent for renewable capital (40 percent for wind).
7   
  Other countries use tax incentives to supplement other policies, most notably the 
feed-in tariffs.  The United Kingdom, for example supplements its green renewables and 
quota instrument with a Climate Change levy, currently set at £4.30 per MWh with an 
exemption for generation from new renewable capacity.   
  The United States relies extensively on tax incentives to support renewable 
electricity.  Here follows a very brief summary of current incentives.
8 
•  Depreciation: renewable electricity capital using wind or solar is allowed a five 
year accelerated depreciation tax life. 
•  Production Tax Credits: Most renewable electricity (except solar) is allowed a 
1.9¢ per kWh production tax credit.  This is subject to biennial reauthorization 
and the current credit expires at the end of 2008.
9   
•  Investment Tax Credits:   Solar and fuel cell powered electricity installations are 
allowed a 30 percent investment tax credit. 
 
Of these three incentives, the production tax credits (PTCs) have received the most 
attention both for its effectiveness at stimulating investment as well as the negative 
impacts of uncertainty over reauthorization at different times.
10  Wiser (2007) notes that it 
“is difficult to overstate the importance of the PTC to the wind industry over this 
timeframe, as well as the negative consequences of PTC expiration for the industry in 
                                                 
6  Malta does allow a fixed feed-in tariff for small solar (below 3.7 kWp).  Source: European Commission 
(2007c). 
7 Source: European Commission (2007b). 
8   See Metcalf (2007) for greater detail and analysis of U.S. energy tax policy. 
9  The Senate Finance Committee has proposed a five-year extension as part of deliberations over the 
current energy legislation in Congress. 
10   Production tax credits operate in a similar fashion as premium feed-in tariffs.  A key difference is the 
source of funding for the tax credits and the political nature of their funding process.    G.  Metcalf 
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2000, 2002, and 2004.” (p. 5).  He provides a graphic illustration of the boom and bust 




The Production Tax Credit expired first in June 1999 and was not extended until 
December 1999.  Wind capacity additions fell by over 90 percent between 1999 and 
2000.  Two years later, the PTC lapsed in December 2001 and was extended in February 
2002.  Again, capacity additions fell from 1,696 MW in 2001 to 410 MW in 2002.  The 
PTC next expired in December 2003 and was extended again the following October and 
capacity additions in 2004 fell by three-quarters from the previous year.  Finally, it is 
worth noting that 2005 was the first year that the PTC was extended prior to its expiration 
and capacity additions actually rose in 2006 from the 2005 levels. 
D. Tender  Programs 
 
  Ireland and France have had tender programs in which the state publishes tender 
offers for the supply of renewable electricity.  Firms then supply the electricity and are 
paid by the state.  France has shifted from a tender to a feed-in tariff and Ireland has 
recently announced plans also to shift (European Commission (2005).      G.  Metcalf 
          10
E.    Policy Summary and Analysis  
  Feed-in tariffs have been a popular policy instrument to encourage investment in 
renewable electricity generation in Europe.  As of late 2006, eighteen countries had some 
form of a feed-in tariff in place.   The use of feed-in tariffs in Europe stands in sharp 
contrast to the use of quotas and green certificates in the United States in RPS programs.  
The view in Europe is that feed-in tariffs have been very successful at stimulating 
renewable investment.  To quote from a recent EU study,  
"...all countries with an effectiveness higher than the EU average [for 
wind] use feed-in tariffs.  This type of system currently has the best 
performance for wind energy." 
European Commission (2005), p.6 
 
The report finds that Germany, Spain, and Denmark have the most effective renewable 
support systems for wind – all of these being feed-in tariffs.  Feed-in tariffs have also 
been successful for biomass, especially in Denmark.  The EU study notes, however, that  
the wide variety of biomass sources and the heterogeneity of the industry make the 
superiority of the tariffs less clear-cut.   
IV. Financing  Analysis 
 
  The review of policies in the United States and Europe suggest that renewable 
capital investment can be encouraged in a number of ways.  The United States relies 
primarily on tax incentives, including accelerated depreciation and production or 
investment tax credits.  Europe, in contrast, has found feed-in tariffs to be very successful 
in encouraging investment.  In this section, I measure the value of current incentives in 
the United States and compare to alternative policies.  In particular, I consider two 
alternative policies: investment expensing and feed-in tariffs.  The approach I use to 
compare investment subsidies is a levelized cost analysis.    G.  Metcalf 
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  The levelized cost analysis measures what price must be received for electricity 
sold by a generator to cover fixed and variable costs of providing the electricity including 
the required return for equity owners.
11  This approach has been used in a variety of 
studies of electric power generation (e.g.  Deutch and Moniz (2003), Tolley and Jones 
(2004), and Sekar et al. (2005)).  My methodology and parameter choices are fully 
described in Metcalf (2007).    
I estimate the levelized cost for the following electricity generation sources: 
natural gas combined cycle, biomass, wind, solar thermal, and solar photovoltaics.  I 
include natural gas as renewables are often viewed as a potential substitute for gas.  
Column 1 of Table 2 reports levelized costs of electricity in cents per kWh (year 2004 
dollars).  I assume that the plant will be placed in service after Jan. 1, 2006 so that solar 
power is not eligible for a production tax credit but does obtain the more generous 30 
percent section 48 investment tax credit.
12   
  The first column reports the levelized costs for the different generating sources 
under current policy.  With existing tax policy, wind and biomass are cost competitive 
with natural gas.  The two forms of solar electricity are considerably more expensive.
13   
 
                                                 
11 The price is a constant real price received over the life of the plant to cover lifetime fixed and variable 
costs.   
12 I have not assumed any limitations on credits from the Alternative Minimum Tax in Table 9. 
13   If solar power is installed as distributed capacity, then the appropriate comparison rate is the retail rate.  
Residential customers pay the highest rates and paid an average rate of 9.45¢ in 2005 according to the 
Energy Information Administration.  Even with this higher comparison rate, solar electricity is not cost 
competitive without further incentives.    G.  Metcalf 
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Table 2.  Alternative Incentive Programs 










  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
Natural Gas  5.47  5.47 5.47  5.47 5.47 
Biomass  5.34  4.99 5.10  4.24 3.27 
Wind  5.04  4.89 4.79  3.94 2.96 
Solar 
Thermal  10.89  13.66 14.27  13.42 12.45 
Solar PV  19.93  25.82 27.76  26.91 25.94 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
  The rest of table 2 discusses alternative policies to the current production and 
investment tax credits.  The first policy option is to eliminate the production and 
investment tax credits and allow investors to expense their investments.  This policy 
change favors biomass and wind.  It adversely affects solar generated electricity raising 
the cost of solar electricity by roughly one-third.    
  Another option is to replace the various tax incentives with a renewable portfolio 
standard.  For solar power to become cost-competitive, an RPS policy would have to 
require enough solar power to drive the price of green certificates for solar over 9¢ for 
solar thermal and 23¢ for solar PV.  It appears that minimal to no limits would be 
required for wind and biomass to continue to be cost competitive with gas.
14 
  A third option to take the place of production and/or investment tax credits is a 
European style feed-in tariff.  I model a ten-year fixed tariff that is set in nominal terms.  
Electricity prices exhibit volatility and a trend in nominal terms so that the feed-in tariff 
                                                 
14   This assumes that gas is the marginal fuel source displaced by wind and biomass.  An analysis by 
Energy Information Administration (2007a) suggests that large-scale expansion of wind would replace coal 
over time.  If prospective investors are choosing between coal and renewable projects then positive green 
certificate prices would be required to get the desired expansion in wind.      G.  Metcalf 
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becomes less valuable over time.
15  The expected present discounted value of the revenue 
stream from the feed-in tariff lowers the levelized cost of the project.  I show three policy 
scenarios in Table 2 above.  They differ in the amount that the rate guarantee exceeds 
current electricity prices.  The first feed-in tariff scenario sets the rate guarantee at 25 
percent above current prices.  At the 2005 average generation price of 5.4¢ per kWh, this 
would be a guarantee of 6.8¢ per kWh.  Even at a rate guarantee that only exceeds current 
prices by 25 percent, wind and biomass producers would be better off than with the 
current production tax credits.  Solar generation is disadvantaged by this policy change.   
  We can compute the break-even rate guarantees for the different renewable 
electricity sources that make generators indifferent between the production or investment 
tax credits and the feed-in tariff.
16  The break-even guarantee for biomass is 7 percent 
over current prices and 17 percent over current prices for wind.  For an electricity price of 
5.4¢, this translates to a fixed tariff rate of  5.8¢ for biomass and 6.3¢ for wind.  The 
break-even rate for solar thermal is 119 percent or 11.8¢ given an electricity price of 
5.4¢.  Solar PV requires a rate guarantee that is 237 percent greater than existing prices or 
18.2¢ in order to obtain the same benefits as they receive with the investment tax credit.   
  Summing up, it appears that a modest feed-in tariff would be sufficient to provide 
at least the same level of support for wind and biomass as are obtained under the current 
production tax credit program.  An additional benefit not modeled here is the stability of 
                                                 
15   I model electricity prices as having no expected trend in real terms based on assumptions in Energy 
Information Administration (2007b).  I assume that the log of price has a standard deviation of 5 percent.   
The value of feed-in tariffs is not appreciably affected by the volatility of prices over reasonable ranges.  I 
calculate the value of the feed-in tariff as the expected present discounted value of the subsidy paid to 
generators using an 8 percent nominal discount rate.  Expected values are computed using Monte Carlo 
methods with 5,000 replications. 
16  It is important to stress that this modeling assumes that firms receive the full benefit of the tax credits.  
As noted above, this does not occur for all firms.  They would, however, receive the full benefit of the feed-
in tariff regardless of tax status.    G.  Metcalf 
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total price received by investors relative to a production tax credit or a premium based 
feed-in tariff.  Evidence from Europe suggests that this stability provides additional value 
to investors. 
 V. Conclusion 
 
  The analysis in this paper provides a number of lessons to guide future 
renewables policy in the United States.  First, it is clear Europe has been extraordinarily 
successful in spurring renewable electricity capital investment.  Second, the European 
experiment with feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards suggests that feed-in 
tariffs may dominate RPS systems as effective policy tools to encourage investment.   
  Third, the US preference for tax incentives has clearly not had the same 
simulative investment impact as have feed-in tariffs.  Partly this is due to the on-again 
off-again nature of production tax credits with a two-year authorization cycle in 
Congress.   But it is also likely due to the inability for many firms, especially start-up 
firms, to take full advantage of the tax incentives.   
  Fourth, a modest feed-in tariff for wind and biomass would make these 
technologies cost competitive with natural gas.  Moreover the tariff responds to market 
conditions in a way that production tax credits do not.  The feed-in tariff responds 
automatically to market conditions with the subsidy increasing if purchase prices fall and 
phasing out as purchase prices rise.   
  Fifth, it is clear that considerable research and technological development will be 
required before solar electricity can compete in the market place regardless of the pricing 
support policy in place.  The very high costs of solar suggest that a two-tiered approach 
for renewables support might be sensible.  Wind, biomass, and geothermal would likely    G.  Metcalf 
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benefit from a shift away from production tax credits to a fixed feed-in tariff system.  
Solar, on the contrary, would likely benefit from continuing with the 30 percent 
investment tax credit put in place in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.     G.  Metcalf 
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